The East Africa Embassy Bombings as Told by its Masterminds (Part 2)

Cover of Fadil Harun’s book

Mombasa, around late October 1997. It was a rainy day in the Kenyan port city and Fadil Harun was playing table tennis at home. A seasoned al-Qa‘ida operative who trained and fought in Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa, Harun was then acting as the “security official” for the group’s East Africa cadre. Born and raised in the Comoros Islands, he had just come back from a month-long stay in his native homeland where he attended his mother’s funeral. On that rainy day, after the sunset prayer, Harun received the visit of Fahd al-Kini, a Kenyan member of al-Qa‘ida who had recently been to Afghanistan. “Abu Muhammad al-Misri is here”, Fahd announced, referring to the man in charge of the organization’s external operations. “Are you kidding?”, Harun asked. “I swear, he is in Mombasa and I brought him here in my car”, Fahd answered. Given that Abu Muhammad “does not move except for external work”, Harun immediately understood: Usama bin Ladin’s “war against the Americans” was about to begin. 

Marking the early origins of Harun’s involvement in the East Africa embassy bombings, this episode features in the Comorian’s autobiography published online in February 2009. This made him the first member of the cell to offer a first-hand account about the topic. Fourteen years before Abu Muhammad, Harun discussed the planning behind the attacks with a level of detail rarely seen in al-Qa‘ida’s writings. Assisting the leader of the operations, Abu Muhammad, throughout the plot, the Comorian was one of the few to be in the know about the whole process. 

In the first installment of this series, we saw how the project of striking the U.S. in East Africa was initially proposed by Fahd to al-Qa‘ida’s leadership in Afghanistan in late 1996-early 1997. Tasked with overseeing the plot, Abu Muhammad moved from Afghanistan to East Africa  in September 1997, reconnecting with Fahd in Nairobi shortly afterward. Drawing on both Abu Muhammad’s and Harun’s accounts, this second installment delves into how the Comorian and others were recruited into the plot, as well as how Abu Muhammad and his men devised their operational planning. 

Security Concerns on the Coast

As his travel to Mombasa indicates, Abu Muhammad was not in Kenya only to brainstorm with Fahd and support him financially. The Egyptian’s other goal was to link up with al-Qa‘ida’s four strong core cadre based on the Kenyan coast. All veterans of Afghanistan and Somalia, these four men had stayed behind when their colleagues relocated to Jalalabad in 1996. In charge of managing the organization’s “Somalia file”, this core cadre was led by Mustafa al-Misri, a senior military figure from Egypt who had been trained by Abu Muhammad in the Afghan camps. In addition to Harun, Mustafa’s associates were fellow Egyptian Shu‘ayb al-Misri and Marwan al-Filistini, a Jordanian national.  

As soon as he heard about his former instructor’s arrival in Mombasa, Mustafa let him know that he wanted to meet up. The two old comrades reunited in a house in Mombasa, where they stayed all night discussing the latest news. After briefing Abu Muhammad on al-Qa‘ida’s activities and relations in Somalia, Mustafa evoked the problematic case of Harun. The Comorian, according to him, was “very negligent” when it came to operational security. Instead of adopting a low-profile, Harun had been forging relations with all sorts of “suspicious people” in Nairobi, including some Somali business owners. Ignoring all the warnings, Harun ended up alienating Mustafa, who feared that the Comorian’s reckless behavior “could cause a disaster for everyone [in Kenya]”. 

In light of these concerns, Mustafa urged Abu Muhammad to order Harun to leave Kenya “as soon as possible”. Instead, he suggested, the Comorian should “join the brothers in Afghanistan”, where working on the front required less “security precautions”. It was now up to the new emir in town, Abu Muhammad, to decide the fate of Harun. 

The next day, Abu Muhammad and Harun met in a tourist area of Mombasa on the shore of the Indian ocean. The two talked for “several hours”, with Harun defending his point of view. According to him, far from being reckless, his behavior was actually “very normal”. As a Black African speaking Swahili with years of experience in Kenya, the Comorian argued, he blended in perfectly with his surroundings and could thus afford to socialize outside jihadi circles without raising suspicion. 

Eventually though, Abu Muhammad ruled that Harun “leave immediately” for Afghanistan, with a stop in Sudan where he would “collect some funds for the Shaykh [i.e., Bin Ladin]”, the Comorian contended. As the latter was arranging his departure, Abu Muhammad made a brief trip to the coastal city of Malindi, where he met the two associates he had not seen yet, Shu‘ayb and Marwan, to discuss the “Somalia file”.Before parting ways, the three agreed on meeting again in a month, once Abu Muhammad would be back from Sudan, where he needed to travel for “some tasks”. 

The Cell Expands

By early November, Abu Muhammad was back in Khartoum. So far, despite the number of “brothers” he had met in Sudan and Kenya, only one of them, Fahd, was working on the East Africa plot. The Egyptian thus decided to begin expanding the cell by recruiting his old friend Talha al-Sudani. “I told him that I needed him for a special job”, Abu Muhammad said. Without knowing further details, Talha welcomed the proposal. Abu Muhammad then briefed the Sudanese on the mission at hand, explaining that it was not without risks and could take some time but that its success would yield “positive outcomes”. 

Talha, for his part, had good news: he had managed to find a transfer system “far removed from complex and monitored banking transactions” which would enable Abu Muhammad to receive funds whenever needed. The two then met a potential unwitting accomplice at Khartoum’s International University of Africa. Initially suspicious, the unnamed man “in his forties” ended up accepting to move some money on their behalf, in return for a commission. 

Although Abu Muhammad did not specify it in his book, the transfer mechanism found by Talha was most likely the informal and trust-based hawala system. In his memoirs, Harun explicitly referred to this, stating that part of the funds used for the East Africa bombings had been moved from Khartoum to Kenya by hawala. 

In addition to the East Africa plot, Abu Muhammad was also busy preparing for his upcoming trip to Yemen, where his Afghanistan-based hierarchy had assigned him to go to initiate the Yemen plot. To travel, he needed another passport, which he obtained via Talha. The Egyptian, in turn, gave it to a “trustworthy” Tunisian “brother” whose task was to doctor the document. 

As agreed before leaving Afghanistan, Abu Muhammad maintained communication with his chain of command in Kandahar to keep them updated about the latest news and receive guidance. From Khartoum, he contacted al-Qa‘ida’s top military leader Abu Hafs al-Misri, informing the latter about his peregrinations between Sudan and Kenya and his imminent travel to Yemen. Having been informed about the Harun case, Abu Hafs suggested that, instead of moving to Afghanistan, the Comorian could be included in “the team that will be working in East Africa”. Left with the ultimate decision, Abu Muhammad responded that he would “consider the matter”.

Ten days or so after Abu Muhammad’s return to Khartoum, Harun and his family followed suit. “Brother Abu Talal was waiting for me at the airport”, the Comorian recalled. A polyglot Moroccan licensed pilot, Abu Talal al-Maghribi was part of the al-Qa‘ida members who had refused to follow Bin Ladin to Afghanistan in 1996. If the Moroccan had drifted away from the group, he was still living among the Arab-Afghan diaspora in Sudan. There, Abu Talal sheltered Harun and his family in the house he shared with other North African jihadis in Khartoum’s al-Manshiyya neighborhood. Having obtained a visa for Pakistan, the Comorian “was certain” that he would soon be living in the Taliban emirate. 

By then, however, Abu Muhammad had opted to follow Abu Hafs’ suggestion regarding the Comorian and broaden the East Africa cell. During a one-on-one meeting, Abu Muhammad revealed to Harun the true reason for his recent arrival from Afghanistan: Abu Hafs “had sent him on a special mission, namely striking the Americans” in Kenya. Further, he added, Abu Hafs had recommended that Harun be part of the plot. If the Comorian were to refuse the assignment, he ought to “forget about the matter as if he had never heard anything” and proceed to Afghanistan. The proposal coming from Abu Hafs and Abu Muhammad being highly regarded by Harun, the latter accepted the mission outright. “Never tell anyone about our work, we do not want anyone to know about our intentions”, Abu Muhammad instructed. The cover story they agreed upon was that, instead of Afghanistan, the Comorian was actually “going back to Somalia for training”. 

If Abu Muhammad’s Sudanese sojourn enabled him to recruit new talents, security concerns came to derail his plans in Yemen. “Everything was ready for the journey”, according to Abu Muhammad, who informed his point of contact there that he was about to move. Shortly before leaving Sudan, however, the point of contact called to inform him that an Egyptian jihadi had just been arrested at Sanaa airport using an altered passport similar to the one Abu Muhammad had obtained through Talha. Fearing that the same fate was awaiting Abu Muhammad, his point of contact advised him not to move. Consequently, Abu Muhammad “postponed” his travel plans, essentially putting on hold his overseeing of the Yemen plot. 

Reconnaissance and Logistics

Around late November, Abu Muhammad and Harun left Khartoum carrying with them a “substantial amount of U.S. dollars” to bankroll the East Africa cell. Once in Nairobi, they booked a hotel in Eastleigh, where they began to discuss their “work program”. “By then, I had resolved myself not to leave Kenya until the completion of the operation”, Abu Muhammad said, considering that “direct supervision” was “the best way to manage operations”. Over the coming months, Abu Muhammad and Harun would primarily focus on scouting and selecting future targets. Their motto: “if you strike, strike hard”. 

The first of these reconnaissance missions started even before the two set foot in Nairobi, albeit in an informal manner. While waiting at the hall of Khartoum airport, the two noticed a large gathering of Sudanese Sufi Shaykhs accompanied by their “disciples”. “Curiosity prompted me to assign brother Harun with the first reconnaissance mission”, Abu Muhammad remembered. Harun then approached one of the Sufi “disciples” to ask him about the reason behind this large gathering and was told that the Shaykhs were en route to attend a major annual Sufi conference in Senegal. 

After this initial training excercise, Abu Muhammad and Harun did their first real casing in Kenya’s capital. Again, this was improvised by the Egyptian. “While in Nairobi”, he recalled, “I noticed a large building to my right. The presence of guards, iron and concrete barricades caught my attention”. Much to his surprise, he learned from Harun that the edifice was the American embassy. “This is an opportunity not to be missed”, the Egyptian said, adding, “if we can breach these iron and concrete barriers, we can access its premises”. Capitalizing on the number of pedestrians in the area where the embassy was located, Abu Muhammad and Harun circled around the building to identify its “weak points” and determine “the easiest ways to breach it”. 

This led Abu Muhammad to consider multiple operational scenarios. Operatives could launch a commando-type attack where they would storm and take control of the edifice. They could also kidnap some of the embassy staff or follow them outside the building to assassinate them. After estimating the number of employees working at the embassy, Abu Muhammad and Harun assessed that the total of casualties for an attack could be “in the hundreds”. 

If Abu Muhammad and Harun reconnoitered the U.S. embassy as soon as they landed in Kenya in late 1997, striking the building was not part of their initial plans. At the time, Abu Muhammad was envisaging it only as “a potential target for the [al-Qa‘ida] organization in the future”. After this “preliminary and quick” scouting, the Egyptian stated that he intended to conduct a more “thorough reconnaissance in the future, before our departure from Kenya, so that it would be a ready project for the [al-Qa‘ida] leadership when it is presented to them”. This is further reflected by the brevity of his stay in Nairobi with Harun: after two days or so, the pair left the city, and would only return months later. 

In reality, the original plot devised by al-Qa‘ida’s East Africa cell was to strike the U.S. in Mombasa. As Abu Muhammad related, he and Harun’s “main objective” in Nairobi was to purchase the necessary supplies to move to Mombasa. After spending December 1997 at a “small hotel” in downtown Mombasa, Abu Muhammad tasked Harun with searching for a “suitable house” to rent. In January 1998, the Comorian, thanks to his local relations, managed to find a new home, a third-floor apartment in the city’s Old Town directly overlooking the oldest Shi‘a Ismaili Center in Kenya. 

In his book, Abu Muhammad never revealed the specific target of his cell in Mombasa. “I did not mention that target, perhaps it will be a future project, God willing”, he explained. While the Egyptian remained evasive, his Comorian deputy was more prolix on the topic. When he was first pitched by Abu Muhammad in Sudan, Harun recounted, he was told that the project consisted in “striking the Americans at the port of Mombasa”. If the port was their original target, Abu Muhammad and Harun did not content themselves with scouting the site. The duo was also interested in Mombasa’s “numerous entertainment venues and bars” frequented by U.S. troops returning from Iraq. According to Harun, he and Abu Muhammad used to roam in the city “to collect the maximum amount of information” on multiple locations. At the time, Abu Muhammad registered as a Yemeni student in a language institute, supposedly to learn Swahili. In reality, he would go there every morning to monitor potential targets located nearby. 

After meticulous reconnaissance “on more than one objective”, Harun stated, Abu Muhammad decided that the port of Mombasa and the city’s “entertainment venues” frequented by U.S. soldiers would be the cell’s primary and secondary targets, respectively. 

While Abu Muhammad and Harun were busy casing and selecting targets, Fahd was undertaking the “preparation process”. After Somalia was ruled out as a place to acquire explosive materials, Abu Muhammad said that Fahd quickly came up with a new yet risky way to achieve this goal. “The slightest suspicion from the seller could lead to serious consequences”, Abu Muhammad maintained. 

If the Egyptian did not give further details, it appears that the alternative found by Fahd was to source explosive materials in Tanzania. According to Harun, the Kenyan was assisted in this task by his comrade ‘Isa al-Tanzani, a young Zanzibarian who was part of “the youth” from the region trained and recruited in the mid-1990s by al-Qa‘ida for its activities in East Africa, especially Somalia. To obtain TNT, the latter managed to convince “some companies” that “he was interested in fishing and drilling”. With the pick-up truck he had just acquired for the plot – “the most common vehicle in the streets of Mombasa” according to Abu Muhammad -, Fahd would transport the explosives across the border to Mombasa before storing them in a warehouse. 

“The wheel of work began to rotate very quickly”, Abu Muhammad narrated, adding that “every day, I felt remarkable progress [in the plot]”. With Fahd intensifying his efforts, the cell rapidly doubled its amount of TNT and detonating fuses. Handling numerous travels between Tanzania and Mombasa all by himself, Fahd ended up exhausted. Consequently, the Kenyan came to Abu Muhammad to ask him to enlist the help of his longtime friend Abu Yahya al-Kini so that the two could share the workload, allowing Fahd to take some rest between two trips. Like Fahd, Abu Yahya grew up in Mombasa as a Salafi before participating in al-Qa‘ida’s efforts in Somalia in the mid-1990s, except that he had never gone to Afghanistan. 

After further inquiry, Abu Muhammad agreed to recruit Abu Yahya. Besides being viewed by his superiors as “one of the best brothers here”, the young Kenyan managed a truck company and had “extensive experience in long travels”. Having formally pledged to obey “all orders issued to him”, Abu Yahya was then established as the East Africa cell’s “fifth element”, according to Abu Muhammad. The cell could now use two vehicles, instead of one, to move between Kenya and Tanzania to stockpile explosives. 

Complementing each other, Fahd and Abu Yahya worked fast, to the point that, by March 1998 or so, “there was little left to complete the preparation process”, Abu Muhammad said. The cell, he continued, had amassed so much explosives that “if every vehicle [for the attacks] required a hundred kilos of TNT … then we had many times that amount [in our possession]”. The cell had even conducted drill exercises in Mombasa, parking cars at the locations they intended to strike. At the time though, the vehicles were not carrying explosives, as the operatives were waiting for the day of the operations to do so. 

Change of Plans

As the cell was finalizing the “preparation process”, Abu Muhammad and Harun expanded the geographical area of their reconnaissance missions. Their destination: Tanzania. This had been in the works for quite some time. “I had obtained a visa for Tanzania a while back, but the workload had prevented me from traveling [there]”, Abu Muhammad said. On the latter’s schedule was scouting the U.S. embassy in Dar-es-Salaam. Lobbying his leader to go exploring the location, Harun used to tell him that he “would be fascinated by it if [he] saw it”. The Comorian viewed the U.S. embassy as an attractive target. According to his information, the building previously belonged to Israel, which had left it to the Americans over security concerns, as the Palestine Liberation Organization had established an office in the city. Further, the building was situated in “an isolated location” together with the French, German, Egyptian and several other embassies.   

Given that the plot had now progressed well, Abu Muhammad, accompanied by Harun, took a trip overland to Tanzania’s capital. Benefiting from the passage of a street vendor in front of the U.S. embassy, the duo took their time to observe the building. “Abu Muhammad was impressed with its location”, Harun remembered. Indeed, they noticed that the site had “a significant security lapse”: approaching the target would not even require an elaborate “plan”, Abu Muhammad concluded. The embassy was not Abu Muhammad’s only plan in Tanzania. While spending time in Dar-es-Salaam’s diplomatic quarters, the pair collected some “very valuable information about this beautiful, quiet neighborhood”, the Egyptian wrote. He and Harun then traveled to the city of Arusha, where they also “gathered significant information useful for [our] work”, before returning to Dar-es-Salaam to conduct a more comprehensive reconnaissance of the U.S. embassy. 

Similar to the Nairobi casing, however, the embassy and various locations scouted by the pair in Tanzania were not part of the cell’s immediate action plan and were only viewed as potential targets for later times. After less than a week in Tanzania, “we decided to return to Mombasa to continue our original work”, Abu Muhammad recounted. 

Upon their return, the duo received news from Pakistan: “the Engineer” was on his way to Kenya. Before his trip to Tanzania, given that the “preparation process” was nearly complete, Abu Muhammad had sent a request to “the brothers in Afghanistan” asking them to send a specialist in “car bombing”. Then living at al-Qa‘ida’s Tarnak Farms in Kandahar, Abu ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Muhajir was selected for the job. At the time, Abu Muhammad said, this senior Egyptian cadre with experience in Afghanistan and Somalia was viewed as among the group’s “most prominent explosives experts, especially in car bombing operations”. Arriving in Kenya around March 1998, al-Muhajir settled in Mombasa, where he lived together with Abu Muhammad and Harun. 

From the outset, operational security matters had been preoccupying the East Africa cell. Keen on maintaining the utmost secrecy around the plot, Abu Muhammad kept all the other al-Qa‘ida members in the region in the dark. “Everyone thought that I had come [to Africa] to continue working [on al-Qa‘ida’s affairs] in Somalia”, he contended. His months-long presence in Kenya, however, ended up raising questions within al-Qa‘ida’s East Africa cadre. “Brother Mustafa was surprised that Abu Muhammad was present throughout this period”, Harun noticed. 

The presence of the Comorian was even more problematic. Indeed, his colleagues viewed him as a security liability and knew that he was supposed to move to Afghanistan. To avoid suspicion regarding Harun’s unexpected return to Kenya and prevent any backlash, Abu Muhammad told the East Africa cadre that the Comorian had been assigned to “some administrative affairs” and would no longer be involved in the organization’s “Somalia file”. As for Fahd, who was not too happy with Harun’s comeback, he was instructed by Abu Muhammad to get along with the Comorian and cooperate with him for the sake of the operations.  

Now that al-Muhajir was in Mombasa, suspicions grew further. With his arrival, “all the youth began to suspect that something was going on”, Harun recounted. As “the youth” were trying “to extract information from Fahd”, he continued, “we warned him not to say anything to anyone and just say that he was going to Tanzania for business”. 

These security concerns extended to communications from Afghanistan as, according to Harun, the cell “did not want Shaykh Abu Hafs to contact us at all” for safety reasons. However, it still managed to send messages to keep al-Qa‘ida’s leadership informed and request support for the operations, as illustrated by the dispatch from Afghanistan of “the Engineer”, al-Muhajir.  

By the time the latter arrived, “I was longing for news from the brothers in Afghanistan”, Abu Muhammad recalled, especially given that “the Engineer” had been taking care of Abu Muhammad’s family in Kandahar since late 1997. In their Mombasa home, aside from discussing al-Qa‘ida’s most recent activities in Afghanistan, the trio also talked extensively about operational planning, with al-Muhajir being briefed about the cell’s equipment. “We are ready for execution at any moment”, Abu Muhammad told him, adding, “we have to prepare the vehicles and place them in the pre-selected locations”. 

Keen on inspecting the explosives stockpiled by Fahd and Abu Yahya, “the Engineer” was taken by the two Kenyan friends to the cell’s storage facility. “This is great! I did not expect to have such quantities”, he said excitedly after seeing the materials, adding that the latter were “excellent”. Al-Muhajir had another request for Abu Muhammad: conducting a test to make sure that the detonators they had were working. “You are joking!!!”, Abu Muhammad exclaimed, “How can we do a test here? We are not in the camps of Afghanistan, Yemen or Somalia”. After much insistence from al-Muhajir, Abu Muhammad granted the request, allowing “the Engineer” to test an improvised explosives device on Mombasa’s beach. “It was very successful, with no sound or flash”, Abu Muhammad wrote, adding that he still considered that test as a “mistake” as it could have jeopardized the whole operation.

By March-April, the East Africa cell had completed the planning for the anti-U.S. attacks in Mombasa. “A very simple thing remained, namely the target”, Abu Muhammad related. Indeed, despite “constant reconnaissance” in the city, he continued, “the desired target had not come yet”. In his autobiography, Harun was more specific about the issue. The “American soldiers” freshly arriving from Iraq that the cell was eagerly waiting for had yet to land at the city’s port. The waiting caused a general sense of concern among the operatives, who feared that too much delay might end up with one of them being arrested by Kenyan authorities. The “recurring question” asked to Abu Muhammad was about the next course of action if the Americans did not come to Mombasa. To “reassure” his men, the Egyptian used to tell them that he had a backup plan. “None of them, even brother Harun, imagined that I would decide to change the entire operation”, Abu Muhammad stated. Eventually, the latter determined that if the Americans failed to show up within the next seven days, he would cancel the Mombasa operations. 

After a week, Harun contended, “we realized that the American soldiers would not come this year due to the high number of operations in Iraq and the strict security measures imposed by their country”. As a result, Abu Muhammad announced to his men the “very difficult” decision he had taken, namely “to shift the entire operation” from Mombasa to a location “far from our place of residence”. “We are going to strike a CIA center”, Abu Muhammad told them, before revealing the new target: “the U.S. embassy in Nairobi”. 

The East Africa Embassy Bombings as Told by its Masterminds (Part 1)

Cover of Abu Muhammad al-Misri’s book 

Khartoum, May 18, 1996. The day Bin Ladin was exiled from Sudan, only ten or so of his men boarded the plane chartered by the Sudanese regime with him. Among these was Abu Muhammad al-Misri. Born ‘Abdallah Ahmad ‘Abdallah al-‘Alfi, this former professional soccer player from Lower Egypt was one of the most senior leaders in al-Qa‘ida and counted among Bin Ladin’s inner circle. Having been tasked with arranging the departure from Sudan, Abu Muhammad was one of the few in the plane who knew the ultimate destination of their flight: Afghanistan. 

Between the Jalalabad palace of Afghanistan’s last king Zahir Shah and the mountains of Tora Bora where they had found shelter, Bin Ladin and his entourage debated at length about al-Qa‘ida’s “future work”. Headed by the leader of al-Qa‘ida, these quasi-daily “work sessions” involved Abu Muhammad and a few other Egyptians, including the organization’s military chief Abu Hafs al-Misri and renowned Arab-Afghan figure Abu al-Walid al-Misri. “We used to sit for long hours discussing ideas, identifying obstacles, and strategizing ways to overcome them”, Abu Muhammad recalled, adding that “everyone agreed on the need to initiate action against the Americans”. The outcome of these discussions came out in late August 1996, when Bin Ladin issued his “Declaration of Jihad against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places”. 

Anti-U.S. war rhetoric was not good enough though. “This statement had to be accompanied by action on the ground”, Abu Muhammad explained. Bin Ladin was therefore determined to “hasten to hit the adversary with a qualitative strike”, reviewing a number of “major” potential targets with Abu Muhammad and other key aides. 

This is how Abu Muhammad opened his book The Road to Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam. Released a week ago by al-Qa‘ida’s media wing, the document provides an insider account of how the organization staged the twin bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam on August 7, 1998. Though undated, it is certain that the manuscript was completed no later than 2019. Indeed, in the summer of that year, Abu Muhammad was already referencing the book in another one he had just finished writing, this time on the 9/11 attacks. By the time he was composing his books, the Egyptian, located in Iran since 2002, had grown more prominent in al-Qa‘ida, essentially acting as the group’s second-in-command. A year later, on August 7, 2020, Abu Muhammad was gunned down along with his daughter in Tehran. The date of the drive-by was highly symbolic: Abu Muhammad was killed on the twenty-second anniversary of the East Africa bombings that he had masterminded. 

Many pages have already been written on the attacks. Yet, the existing literature has mostly relied on the accounts of detained operatives who, despite their involvement, were not privy to the whole scheme. Abu Muhammad, by contrast, was the leader of the cell responsible for the bombings, hence enjoying a unique perspective on their planning. Together with the memoirs of Fadil Harun, a Comorian al-Qa‘ida cadre also instrumental in orchestrating the bombings, Abu Muhammad’s book is undoubtedly the most detailed first-hand account on the topic to date. 

Twenty-five years after the attacks, this series aims at retracing the inside story behind the plot by exploring the accounts of two of its most important players, Abu Muhammad and Harun. In doing so, it highlights information and details which have never transpired in the investigation, thus filling in some of the missing pieces of the puzzle. 

Eying in on East Africa 

If the bombings in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam were al-Qa‘ida’s first high-profile external operations, East Africa was not part of the group’s initial plan in its war against the U.S. In late 1996 or so, from their newly built housing compound in Najm al-Jihad, south of Jalalabad, Bin Ladin and his advisors decided that the first operation would take place in Yemen. From Abu Muhammad’s account, it appears that it was a visit from “one of the veteran mujahidin brothers” which heavily factored in the start of the plot. Coming from Yemen, the unnamed “veteran” met with al-Qa‘ida’s senior leaders in Afghanistan and informed them that, “for years”, he had been storing “a large amount of TNT”. According to Abu Muhammad, the “veteran” then “offered it to Shaykh Usama so that it could be used against the American enemy [in Yemen]”. A “deal” was concluded: al-Qa‘ida would use the explosives sourced by the “veteran” to strike a “major” U.S. target in Yemen. “I was assigned to this operation”, Abu Muhammad stated. 

Around that time, al-Qa‘ida received another fateful visit to its Jalalabad headquarters, this time from a “Kenyan delegation” composed of “two honorable brothers” from Mombasa: Fahd al-Kini and Suhayb. These two Kenyans of Yemeni descent had just come back from Khost where they had undertaken advanced “military courses” at Jihad Wal, al-Qa‘ida’s then main training camp. Despite his young age, Fahd was already well-acquainted with Bin Ladin’s men and the Afghan militant environment. Influenced “by the emerging Salafi predication in Mombasa”, he took his first trip to Afghanistan’s training camps in 1994 and helped some of his comrades to follow suit. Upon his return home, Fahd would actively support al-Qa‘ida’s activities in East Africa. 

“The two brothers stayed with us [in Afghanistan] for about two months”, Abu Muhammad recalled. During that period, the Kenyan pair made a strong impression on their al-Qa‘ida associates. Not only had they been recommended by their trainers at Jihad Wal, they were also described by Abu Muhammad as “among the best brothers who joined us” for their “authenticity, good manners and distinct activism”. Fahd and Suhayb also stood out for their intense “anger toward the Americans” who, according to them, “plundered all [Kenya’s] wealth with arrogance”. Besides, the Kenyans used to convey “stories” about U.S. troops in Mombasa openly committing all sorts of “immoral practices” and “transgressions” against helpless locals. 

Fahd’s “anger” had almost pushed him to take action. One day, he told Abu Muhammad, after witnessing first-hand “indecencies” from American soldiers on the streets of Mombasa, he had thought about grabbing the automatic weapon he owned “to kill these criminals”. To Abu Muhammad, it was clear that Fahd still wanted “to do something” but needed support and guidance. This was precisely what al-Qa‘ida could offer. 

“One morning”, Abu Muhammad recounted, “brother Fahd presented us with a project of an operation against the American soldiers [in East Africa]”. The young Kenyan specified that, if al-Qa‘ida were to validate his plan, he would be willing to cooperate in any aspect and find “weapons” and “explosives” for the operation.  

The idea of striking in East Africa had been in the mind of al-Qa‘ida’s senior leadership long before Fahd’s proposal. During its years in Sudan, Abu Muhammad related, the organization had “laid the groundwork for targeting several American and Jewish interests”, with Bin Ladin dispatching a few experienced cadres to conduct surveillance on Western interests in the region. Among the potential targets scouted by Bin Ladin’s crew was the U.S. embassy in Nairobi. At the time though, Abu Muhammad explained, al-Qa‘ida did not deem it wise to strike, as the Sudanese government was viewed as “too weak to handle the repercussions [of such attacks]”. Since then, the organization had been keeping “these plans” on its “watch list”, waiting to find “the appropriate theater for launching such operations”. Now that al-Qa‘ida had moved to Afghanistan, it seems that it had found the ideal launching pad for its anti-U.S. jihad.

After a thorough study of Fadh’s project, Bin Ladin and his lieutenants “approved of working against the Americans in East Africa”. Once again, Abu Muhammad was chosen to run the operation. The Egyptian knew the region well. Throughout the first half of the 1990s, he had played a leading role in al-Qa‘ida’s operations in Somalia and spent time in Nairobi.  Besides the support provided to Fahd, the group opted to give top priority to the Kenyan’s plot, underlining the general enthusiasm for it. As for the Yemen plot, Abu Muhammad would still supervise it, but would leave the operational minutia to the “veteran” on the ground. With Abu Muhammad overseeing both plots, al-Qa‘ida hoped to launch near-simultaneous attacks in East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. 

After discussing “operational arrangements” with Fahd, Bin Ladin and his aides dispatched the Kenyan back home, where he was to keep the plan to himself while waiting for Abu Muhammad to join him in Kenya.  

Delayed Departure

After Fahd left, Abu Muhammad faced a number of issues in Afghanistan which significantly impeded his move to East Africa. 

Having been entrusted with managing al-Qa‘ida’s attacks overseas, the Egyptian’s most pressing matter was to acquire proper travel documents. Typically, this kind of job was handled by the “documents office”, which Abu Muhammad described as a “highly skilled and professional” crew in charge of altering papers for the members of the organization. Since al-Qa‘ida’s relocation from Sudan, however, the “office” in Afghanistan was not yet fully operational. Abu Muhammad’s future passport was thus sent to “the brothers in Pakistan”, who then doctored the document before sending it back to Jalalabad. The problem for Abu Muhammad was that his forged papers had “evident defects”. Al-Qa‘ida decided to pick another passport and start the forgery process all over again, therefore stalling Abu Muhammad in his endeavor.  

Aside from this technical setback, Afghanistan’s changing circumstances further hampered Abu Muhammad’s plans. By early 1997, al-Qa‘ida’s Jalalabad headquarters were no longer deemed safe. Bin Ladin’s Afghan protectors had informed their Arab guests that a Gulf-sponsored “conspiracy” was being hatched by the former governor of Jalalabad, Hajji Qadir, who planned to assassinate Bin Ladin and attack the Najm al-Jihad compound. Other local figures, including Commander Massoud, had expressed their willingness to launch operations against “the Arabs” and expel them from Afghanistan. In March 1997, Bin Ladin, Abu Muhammad and the rest of their companions, along with their families, hastily left Najm al-Jihad to relocate to the Tarnak Farms complex near Kandahar airport. Given that the compound was not ready yet to house all the newcomers, al-Qa‘ida’s members then busied themselves with preparing the accommodation of their families. 

Abu Muhammad’s agenda was further hindered by the war between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. In mid-1997, Mullah Omar sought help from al-Qa‘ida’s Arab fighters to defend Kabul, where Taliban defenses were collapsing against Massoud’s forces. “Shaykh Usama mobilized all the brothers present at that time”, Abu Muhammad related, adding that “a large number” of his Kandahar-based comrades then headed to Kabul to participate in the fight. Abu Hafs al-Misri, who supervised al-Qa‘ida’s military contingent in Kabul, wanted Abu Muhammad to assist him for a one-month period. The idea, however, was met by Abu al-Walid al-Misri’s “fierce opposition”, as the latter believed Abu Muhammad should prioritize setting in motion the East Africa and Yemen plots, a no less important mission than staying on the Afghan frontlines. Upon Abu Hafs’ “insistence”, Bin Ladin ruled that Abu Muhammad remain in Afghanistan to participate in the Kabul battle. Although Abu Muhammad did not mention it in his book, one account indicates that at the time, Fahd was back from Kenya and fought on the front north of Kabul. 

If the Taliban and its Arab allies succeeded in repelling Massoud’s forces, the Kabul battle came very close to derailing al-Qa‘ida’s external program. As Abu Muhammad and two of his Arab colleagues were walking toward a military position, they were intercepted by a Taliban fighter, who had no idea who they were. The Afghan was suspicious, as many Arabs had initially fought the Taliban before the latter took over Afghanistan. With the language barrier, Abu Muhammad was unable to make the fighter understand that they were actually on the same side. The Afghan eventually panicked and emptied his magazine at Abu Muhammad who, against all odds, came out uninjured from the incident.  

As Abu Muhammad remained on the Kabul frontline, Abu al-Walid had not changed his mind as to what his friend’s priority should be. Anytime the two would be in the same room, Abu al-Walid would point at Abu Muhammad and ask Bin Ladin, “why is this man [still] sitting here?” In the end, it was illness that forced Abu Muhammad to leave the front behind. After three weeks in Kabul, the Egyptian ended up contracting typhoid fever and was treated “for about a week”, he remembered. 

Once he got back on his feet, Abu Muhammad returned to Kandahar by helicopter and resumed making arrangements for his assignment overseas. At Tarnak Farms, he would regularly sit with Bin Ladin in “a small, modest room next to the [compound’s] mosque”. During these “private sessions”, the two would discuss and refine al-Qa‘ida’s upcoming external program. In spite of the group’s then precarious “financial situation”, Bin Ladin was determined to provide every ressources to secure the success of the operations and “pledged” to Abu Muhammad that al-Qa‘ida would send him as much money as he needed. 

By early September 1997, the “documents office” had finally come up with a new, properly forged passport and Abu Muhammad was ready to move. Bearing in mind that Fahd’s project had been sanctioned around late 1996-early 1997, it thus took Abu Muhammad close to a year to organize his affairs. “No one knew my destination except the Shaykh [i.e., Bin Ladin] and a few senior brothers”, Abu Muhammad said, highlighting the secrecy around his mission. 

On Tuesday morning, September 2, the Egyptian left his family in the care of two close colleagues before returning one last time to Tarnak Farms’ mosque to see Bin Ladin. “Be generous”, the latter told Abu Muhammad, “if the target requires 100 kilos [of explosives], give it 500”. The leader of al-Qa‘ida specified that, if suicide-bombers were to be used for the attacks, his son ‘Abd al-Rahman was “ready”.

After leaving his boss in Kandahar, Abu Muhammad took a car along with Abu Hafs and another countryman. Their journey took them to a car station, where Abu Muhammad was picked up by “one of the Pakistani mujahidin brothers”. Although he would remain unaware of Abu Muhammad’s plans, this security-savvy “brother” had been selected to act as the “liaison officer” between Abu Muhammad and Abu Hafs throughout the entire operational planning of the attacks. The Pakistani, whom Abu Muhammad did not name “for security reasons”, drove the Egyptian in a taxi-cab across the border to Pakistan, ending up in Karachi. Once at the city’s airport, the taxi driver/”liaison officer” left Abu Muhammad, who then flew out of Pakistan. 

Initiating the “Preparation Process”

Abu Muhammad’s first stop was Sudan, al-Qa‘ida’s former safe haven. From now on, the country would function as the financial hub for the Egyptian’s (external) operations. 

Arriving at Khartoum airport via Doha, the Egyptian then briefly rested at a three-star hotel downtown, before calling Talha al-Sudani to let him know that he was around. A former engineering student who participated in the anti-Soviet jihad, Talha acted as a training-camp instructor in Afghanistan during the early 90s and was reputed for his skills in “heavy artillery” and “topography”. Afterward, he became a key player in al-Qa‘ida’s activities in Africa, joining the first team sent by the group to Somalia in 1992 before leading Bin Ladin’s security detail in Sudan. In 1995, Talha was involved in a failed assassination attempt against Hosni Mubarak in Ethiopia. By now, the Sudanese was considered as “one of the major cadres in the [al-Qa‘ida] organization”, according to Abu Muhammad, who enjoyed a deep “brotherly relationship” with him. 

After Talha picked up his Egyptian friend, the two sat for “a long session” focused on “the brothers in Afghanistan”. Abu Muhammad informed the Sudanese that he would soon travel to Afghanistan to deliver “some important entrusted items and reports” to Bin Ladin. The news rejoiced Talha. Indeed, instead of following his “brothers” to Jalalabad in 1996, he had been instructed by Bin Ladin to remain in Sudan to oversee al-Qa‘ida’s financial affairs in the country, where the group had retained some assets and infrastructure.  

Aside from Talha, Abu Muhammad also reconnected with the community of Arab-Afghans still living in Sudan’s capital. Despite their refusal to follow their brothers in arms to Afghanistan in 1996, Abu Muhammad worked on maintaining good relationships with them, helping them to resolve their respective issues, even when they were not part of al-Qa‘ida. Some, for instance, needed money to travel to Europe, while others needed travel documents. 

If Abu Muhammad met “many brothers” at the time, he did not forget the importance of maintaining total secrecy around his primary mission. Given that he would soon leave Sudan, he used to tell his interlocutors that his next destination was simply “Africa”, a “convincing” answer in his eyes as everyone around him knew of his long experience in Somalia and his past frequent travels to the region. 

Meanwhile, Abu Muhammad was keeping tabs on the East Africa plot, regularly calling Fahd “to check on the progress of the work”. Overall, Abu Muhammad was told, things were going pretty well. The Kenyan relayed that he had acquired some explosives and evoked “many promising developments”. However, he had spent all the money he had been provided with and needed additional funds “urgently”. 

Abu Muhammad thus reached out to Talha, then busy liquidating al-Qa‘ida’s assets in Sudan. “I asked him to allocate a sum of $100,000 to my account, to be available on request”, Abu Muhammad contended, further instructing that no other “brothers” in Sudan should know about the special account. Having the required amount ready at hand, Talha then worked on finding a secure transfer mechanism to enable Abu Muhammad to continue receiving funds once outside of Sudan. 

In early October 1997, Abu Muhammad flew to Kenya, where he planned on staying for “two or three weeks”. His top priority was to meet up with Fahd to set the East Africa plot in motion, even though the Kenyan had already begun laying the groundwork. After reuniting at Nairobi airport, Fahd drove Abu Muhammad to the city’s Eastleigh neighborhood, where they booked a room at a hotel the Egyptian used to frequent during his Somalia adventures. 

Around a cup of tea, the two talked in considerable detail about the future operation, its feasibility as well as the resources and equipment it required. In those discussions, Fahd appeared “very optimistic”, asserting that he could procure “everything necessary” for the attack and that, if asked, he would carry it out himself. He also brought a “surprise” to Abu Muhammad: a couple of Cordtex detonating cords and a small amount of TNT. Fahd had acquired these materials from a Somali jihadi whom Abu Muhammad had personally trained back in the day. Given that the Somali was interested in selling more of these materials, he could be enlisted as the explosives supplier for the operation, Fahd proposed.

Eventually, Abu Muhammad and Fahd agreed upon a formal “work plan”, their respective cover stories as well as a “security protocol”. The latter, according to Abu Muhammad, was a “simple” system of communications which would still “be difficult to understand for anyone listening”. In Abu Muhammad’s opinion, operational security required severing all ties with their “Somali brothers”, who could be under the surveillance of intelligence services. Consequently, even though “the offer was very tempting”, the Egyptian declined Fadh’s proposal to secure explosive materials from the aforementioned Somali jihadi. To avoid compromising the mission, Abu Muhammad decided that even the rest of the al-Qa‘ida “brothers” in East Africa would not be informed about the plot. 

At the end of the meeting, Abu Muhammad gave almost all the cash he had brought with him from Sudan to Fahd. The latter’s priority now was to find a way to source explosives elsewhere than in Somalia. “I told him not to worry about the price; the crucial thing was to secure the materials”, Abu Muhammad said. 

The “preparation process” of the East Africa plot had just begun.